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Abstract 
This paper concerns municipal preferences for state  imposed municipal amalgamations.  The  main 
purpose of the paper is to study what factors that can explain municipal acceptance or objection of a 
state imposed amalgamation decision.  The empirical analysis is based on the extensive municipal 
reform in Sweden in 1952. As much as 66 percent of the newly formed municipalities had at least one 
municipality  that  objected  to  the  new  organisation.  The  results  indicate  that  the  size  of  the 
municipality  is  of  importance;  small  and  large  municipalities  are  most  likely  to  accept  the 
amalgamation decision. Furthermore, the relative municipal size affects the probability of accepting 
the  amalgamation  decision  and  equally  sized  municipalities  are  less  likely  to  amalgamate  on  a 
voluntary basis. We also find that interjurisdictional co-operation prior to the reform has a positive 
effect on the municipal decision to accept the new municipal structure. 
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1. Introduction 
The restructuring of administrative borders in the local government sector is partly determined by an 
evolutionary process, and partly by a revolutionary process through structural reforms (see Boyne and 
Cole, 1998). In the post-war era, several nations have implemented extensive municipal reforms that 
have reduced the number of municipalities. Structural reforms are generally state imposed and local 
government amalgamations are often associated with a conflict between local and national interests.  
From  the  theoretical  side,  the  formation  of  political  and  fiscal  unions  has  received 
increasing interest in the literature on fiscal federalism (see e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997, Bolton 
and Roland, 1997, Ellingsen, 1998). Alesina et al. (1995) summarizes some of the key mechanisms 
that determine the size of political and fiscal unions. The most general argument in favour of larger 
jurisdictions is realisation of scale economies in the provision of public goods. A more concentrated 
horizontal  structure  is  also  more  likely  to  internalise  inter-jurisdictional  externalities.  These  two 
arguments relate to efficiency in the provision of public goods. According to Alesina et al., a further 
argument is that redistribution may have a public good dimension; in this perspective a decentralised 
government  structure  may  provide  too  little  redistribution.  The  optimal  government  structure  is 
generally seen as a trade off between these arguments on the one hand and the efficiency gain from 
providing public goods consistent with local preferences on the other hand.  
The  empirical  literature  has  not  presented  so  much  knowledge  about  what  factors 
determine  successful  amalgamations  and  furthermore,  what  are  the  pre-requisites  for  reaching 
voluntary agreements in the process of consolidating governments? Previous empirical studies have 
foremost been concerned with the determinants of the number of jurisdictions within a given area (see 
e.g., Kenny and Schmidt, 1994, Nelson, 1997, Martines-Vasquez et al., 1997, Fisher and Wassmer, 
1998,  and  Alesina  et  al.,  2004).  A  few  studies  have  analysed  determinants  of  consolidation  by 
comparing characteristics in the separate units and the newly formed entity. Brasington (1999) studied 
school district consolidation in the U.S. He found that small and large districts were most likely to 
merge  while medium sized districts did not tend to merge.  One explanation is that medium sized 
districts  were  not  able  to  realise  scale  economies  to  such  extent  that  the  loss  of  control  was compensated for. Brasington (2003, 2004) have provided more insights into the formation of school 
districts, e.g. the importance of racial and income differences,  and size effects.  While Brasington 
(1999) impose restrictions on the parameters in a bivariate probit, meaning that he cannot separate the 
effects for small and large municipalities, Brasington (2004) found that large jurisdictions are more 
likely to consolidate while small jurisdictions do not want to consolidate with large jurisdictions. A 
further contribution is Gordon and Knight (2006) that study school district formation while allowing 
for spatial interdependence between districts, i.e. in contrast to Brasington (1999, 2003, 2004) they 
also take into consideration that a merger also affects the choice set for neighbouring municipalities. A 
related  topic  is  the  break-up  of  entities;  Brink  (2003)  studied  the  break-ups  of  municipalities  in 
Sweden for the period 1977-1999. Brink analysed the decision of the median voter in the seceding 
municipal part. She tested three hypotheses; the first stated that differences in tax bases affect the vote 
for secession. The second hypothesis is that secession is associated with an efficiency loss due to 
smaller population. The third hypothesis concerns political preferences. Brink found that municipal 
parts  that  had  high  income  compared  to  the  other  municipal  part  were  more  likely  to  vote  for 
secession.  A  shortcoming  with  Brinks  study  is  that  the  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  only  24 
observations.  
The main purpose of this paper is to study municipal preferences for amalgamations. 
This is done by studying the municipalities’ statements in a nation-wide municipal reform, i.e. the 
municipalities’ acceptance or objection of the state imposed amalgamation decision. The empirical 
analysis is based on the 1952 municipal reform in Sweden. The main purpose of the reform was to 
amalgamate  municipalities  so  they  reached  a  critical  size  of  2  000  inhabitants.  The  1952  reform 
reduced the number of municipalities from 2 498 to 1 037. Although municipalities did not have a 
veto,  they  were  given  the  opportunity  to  comment  the  amalgamation  decision  from  the  national 
government, 66 percent of the newly formed municipalities had at least one municipality that objected 
to the amalgamation plan.  
One problem in empirical studies of local government consolidation, or co-operation, is 
that the different amalgamation alternatives the local governments faces are not known. In order to 
identify local government preferences for an observed amalgamation one also need to observe the alternatives that are feasible. To avoid this problem Brasington (1999) assumed that only two districts 
could  consolidate  at  a  time,  and  preceded  by  constructing  potential  pair  wise  constellations  and 
estimated  bivariate  probit  models.  This  approach  may  be  complicated  when  three  or  more 
municipalities or districts can amalgamate at a time since the number of potential constellations grows 
very fast. Another problem is that preferences for amalgamations is not directly observed, it is merely 
assumed that consolidation reflects local preferences and not some unobserved factors, e.g. insistence 
from other jurisdictions. In this paper we are able to directly observe municipal opinions for a state 
imposed amalgamation decision. Thus, in contrast to previous studies we do not have to identify all 
possible amalgamation alternatives.  As  far as  we know, this is also the first study that is able to 
actually observe local government opinions in a state imposed local government reform.
1 Thus, we 
explore  amalgamations  in  general  and  not  only  consolidation  within  a  specific  area,  e.g.  school 
districts. A further contribution of the paper is that the empirical analysis is based on an extensive data 
set  that  contains  municipal  characteristics  that  have  not  been  examined  in  earlier  literature,  e.g. 
political composition in local governments, industry structures, and more subtle differences between 
municipalities such as historical bindings and local church communities. These factors may reflect 
differences  in  preferences  for  public  goods  and  can  therefore  be  obstacles  for  voluntary 
amalgamations. A further contribution is that we examine the importance of municipal co-operation 
prior to the consolidation such as municipal unions. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two a brief background description of the 
municipal  reform  is  presented.  Section  three  contains  the  empirical  model.  Data  description  and 
descriptive statistics are presented in section four and the results are presented in section five. Section 
six concludes. 
 
2. The 1952 municipal reform in Sweden 
The 1952 reform must be looked at with the development of the society in mind, especially if one 
wants to understand the formation of local governments more generally and not only this historical 
                                                 
1 See Wångmar (2003) for an extensive analysis of the 1952 reform from a historical and political perspective. example. In the 19
th century the agriculture sector was dominating, in 1870 as much as 70 percent of 
the  population  was  occupied  in  the  agriculture  sector,  only  15  percent  was  occupied  in  the 
manufacturing sector. The industry structure was however in the beginning of a rapid transformation; 
in 1930 the agriculture sector and the manufacturing sector were about the same size with respect to 
the number of people occupied in the sectors. The industrial breakthrough went hand in hand with an 
economic development and a very strong urbanisation process. The urbanisation process increased the 
number of small municipalities, especially in the rural areas. The share of the municipalities with less 
than 500 inhabitants was 16 percent in 1910; in 1930 the share had increased to 19 percent. In 1949 
the share was as high as 25 percent (Thunborg, 1950).  
The economic development also enabled a development of the welfare systems, e.g. 
education, health services, and social services. During the time period that preceded the reform, the 
social democratic government expanded the public services in  connection to a decentralisation of 
responsibilities to the municipalities. As a result, public services and spending increased dramatically 
at the local level. In real terms, expenditures in the municipal sector were five times higher in 1950 
compared to 1915 (see, e.g. Wångmar, 2003).  
All together, the rapid depopulation of rural areas and the growth of the public sector 
necessitated an extensive municipal reform in order to fulfil local and regional welfare commitments. 
One opposing argument was that the extensive intergovernmental co-operation that had emerged could 
replace the reform. In 1951, 1 300 municipal unions provided different municipal services.
2 Although 
the municipal unions may have exploited scale economies, they were not considered as a long-term 
solution by the national government.  One line of argument was that a local government structure 
where municipal unions (special districts) provide specific services will result in many overlapping 
governments, and as a consequence, political decisions may be more fragmented, and it might be 
difficult for the inhabitants to monitor the political process. SOU (1945:38) also stated that a large 
number of overlapping governments would be likely to result in much higher expenditures.  
                                                 
2 In 1952, the number of municipal unions were reduced from 1 300 to 173 due to the reform. In 1945, an official report presented a general policy for the 1952 municipal reform 
(1945:38). The reform policy was manifested by two objectives. The main objective of the reform was 
to  amalgamate  municipalities  in  a  way  that  they  had  at  least  2 000  inhabitants.  A  second 
complementary criteria was that the new municipalities should have tax base of at least 800 000 SEK.
3 
Concerning expenditure and income patterns for the time period of the reform, education was the 
largest item among the operating costs (approximately 25 percent of the total operating costs). Social 
service and sanitary services were also relatively large items (approximately 10 percent of total costs). 
The local income tax was the main revenue source (approximately 50-60 percent). State grants were 
the second largest revenue source; grants were mainly distributed as matching grants and the primary 
school was the dominant item (see Kommunernas Finanser).  
Municipal amalgamations were not voluntary meaning that the county councils were 
responsible  for  working  out  the  amalgamation  proposal  and  His  Majesty  made  the  final  decision 
concerning  the  municipal  structure.  The  amalgamation  process  started  in  1946  when  the  county 
administrations made the first investigations concerning the new municipal structure. Geographical 
circumstances  were  important  restrictions  for  the  implementation  of  the  reform;  e.g.  several 
municipalities that constituted an island were not affected by the reform. Large land areas and the 
infrastructure were also considered when the new municipal borders were settled. The official report  
also pointed out that the natural affinity between municipalities was an important to consider when 
forming the new municipal structure. Interjurisdictional co-operation (municipal unions) but also other 
administrative borders such as common parishes and hundreds were seen as starting points for the 
settlement of the new borders. This means that the final proposal had considered several municipal 
characteristics,  both  the  characteristics  of  the  old  municipality  and  the  structure  of  the  new 
municipality as well as differences, or similarities, between the amalgamating parts.  
Since the reform was very extensive, the legitimacy of the democratic process required 
that  the  municipalities  were  given  some  influence  on  the  planning  process  of  the  new  municipal 
structure. Representatives from the municipalities were thus given opportunities to comment drafts of 
                                                 
3 A tax base of 800 000 SEK corresponds to approximately 12 500 000 SEK mearured in 2002 money value. the amalgamation proposal that were presented by the county administrations. Although one can argue 
that obstacles to amalgamations that could be identified prior to the reform had been considered, there 
was still strong resistance to the final amalgamation decision presented in 1950. Wångmar (2003) 
states that the municipal structure was practically determined early in the planning process and that the 
municipalities did not affect the amalgamation process to any large extent. The validity of the analysis 
in  this  paper  hinges  on  to  what  extent  the  municipalities  reveal  their  preferences  when  they 
commented  on  the  final  amalgamation  decision.  Since  a  government  resolution  stated  that 
municipalities did not have a veto concerning the final decision, one might question that municipalities 
revealed their true preferences. However, if the municipalities have been involved in a long planning 
process and it is stated that the county councils should consider local preferences, it seems reasonable 
that the municipalities revealed their preferences in the statement, maybe as a final attempt to change 
the amalgamation plan. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
In this section we present our empirical strategy for analysing municipal preferences for the final 
amalgamation decision made by his Majesty in 1950. Municipalities expressed their views on the final 
decision in three different ways; they either accepted or object the amalgamation plan, furthermore, 
some municipalities objected to the decision and suggested an alternative constellation. However, our 
documentation of the reform does not reveal exactly what the alternative proposal consisted of.  This 
means that we can only study the first and the second alternative. The reason for excluding the third 
alternative is that  we do not know the alternative amalgamation proposal from the  municipalities 
meaning that we are not able to study their preferences.  
To clarify this, assume that a representative individual in each municipality makes the 
decision to accept or object to the amalgamation decision. The representative individual has utility 
u(a)  from  amalgamation,  utility  u(na)  if  the  municipality  remains  intact  by  the  reform  (non-
amalgamated) and utility u(alt) if the municipality amalgamate according to the alternative. In the first 
case  we  know  that  u(a)  >  u(na);  although    it  might  be  the  case  that  u(a)  >  u(alt)  >  u(na),  the 
preferences are possible to identify. In the second case we know that u(na) > u(a). Like the former case, we can not exclude the possibility that u(na) > u(alt) > u(a); however, the preferences are also 
possible to identify in this case.  In the third case we know that u(alt) > u(a). Since we do not have 
information on the alternative amalgamation suggested by the municipality we cannot identify the 
preferences in this case. The lack of information means that we do not know if the municipality has 
responded “yes, but we would like an alternative amalgamation”, that is, u(alt) > u(a) > u(na), or if 
the municipality responded “no, but we would like an alternative amalgamation”, u(alt) > u(na) > 
u(a). 
The municipal decision to accept or object to the amalgamation proposal is analysed by 
estimating the following logit model 
 
Yi= Yi(Mi, Zj, Di) 
 
where Yi represents the municipal preferences for the amalgamation decision, i.e. amalgamation into 
the new entity j. Yi takes the value one if the municipality accepts the amalgamation proposal, zero 
otherwise. It is assumed that the municipal preferences for amalgamations are determined by three 
categories of variables represented by the vectors Mi, Zj, and Di. The first category, Mi, is municipal 
characteristics of municipality i prior to the reform. The municipal decision is also assumed to depend 
on the characteristics of the new entity (the municipality j) which is represented by the vector Zj. 
Finally, the municipal statement on the amalgamation proposal is dependent on its own characteristics 
in relation to the other municipalities forming the new entity. These variables describing the relation to 
the other municipalities are represented by the vector Di. For some variables in Di each municipality is 
assumed to consider the other municipalities (in the municipality j) as a unity. 
 
The following variables are included in M: 
The variables included in Mi
 are assumed to reflect municipal characteristics prior to the reform that 
may determine preferences for amalgamation or remaining independent. One of the main arguments in 
favour of amalgamations is realisation of scale economies. Small municipalities may gain significantly 
from scale  economies  while larger  municipalities may gain less. Population size in municipality i (popi) is therefore expected to have a negative effect on the probability of accepting the amalgamation 
proposal. An argument that has been put forth in previous studies (e.g. Brasington, 2004) is that when 
a municipality reach some critical size it is large enough to remain in control in case of consolidation 
and still realise some scale economies.  Population size squared (pop_sqi) is therefore expected to have 
a positive effect on the decision to amalgamate.  
Autonomy is assumed to be a normal good, which implies that mean income (inci) is 
expected  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  probability  of  accepting  an  amalgamation.  Since 
geographical circumstances were important in the reform, the land area of the municipality is included 
in the regression. The land area of the municipality (areai) may be  a restriction since geographic 
distance  may  have  a  deterrent  impact  of  local  public  services.  A  political  variable  is  included, 
indicating whether the socialist parties, conservative parties or other parties had a majority in the local 
parliament (soci, consi, otheri). In the estimations, municipalities with socialist majority in the local 
parliament are the reference group. At the national level there was some differences between parties; 
the Socialist Democratic Party implemented the 1952 reform and the conservative parties argued that 
the reform was too extensive. If the decision to accept the amalgamation proposal has a political 
dimension, the effect is expected to be captured by the political dummy variable.  
Dummy variables indicating the industry structure of the municipality are included and 
four categories are specified. The first consists of municipalities where more than 75 percent of the 
working population was occupied within agriculture (>75i). The second category is municipalities 
where  50-75  percent  was  employed  in  the  agriculture  sector  (50-75i),  the  third  category  is 
municipalities where less than 50 percent was employed in the agriculture sector (<50i). The fourth 
category is municipalities where more that 67 percent of the population was living in urban areas 
(urbani). This latter category only indirectly captures the industry structure. Three additional dummy 
variables describe the municipal structure: rural municipalities (rurali), cities (cityi), and boroughs 
(boroughi).
4  In  the  regression  model,  rural  municipalities  are  used  as  the  reference  group.  The 
                                                 
4 The municipal type (rural, type, and borough) is an administrative definition and to some extent the municipal 
categories had different commitments concerning the provision of public services. Therefore we include this variables capturing municipal structures may capture expectations of future local development, e.g. 
migration  patterns,  economic  development,  and  the  need  for  amalgamations.  Regional  (county) 
dummy variables are included in order to control for unobserved county specific factors; the county of 
Stockholm  (the  capital  of  Sweden)  is  the  reference  group.  The  variable  unioni  indicates  whether 
municipality i was a member of at least one municipal union (special district); the members of this 
union did not need to coincide with the municipalities that formed the new entity.
5 The union variable 
is  included  to  control  for  co-operation  experiences  in  general  and  not  co-operation  among  the 
amalgamating municipalities.  
 
The following variables are included in Z: 
The variables in the Z vector describe different characteristics of the new entity. A dummy variable 
indicating whether the municipalities in the new formation co-operated in a municipal union prior to 
the reform (unionj) is included. Two additional variables describe previous connections between the 
municipalities  that  formed  the  new  entity.  The  first  indicates  if  the  municipalities  constituted  a 
common parish (parishj) and the second indicates if the municipalities constituted a common hundred 
(hundredj).
6 These three variables (union, parish, and hundred) are included to control for previous co-
operation experiences and local affinity, among the municipalities in the new municipality, and how 
they affect the decision to accept the amalgamation proposal. 
The number of municipalities forming the new municipality (nr_munj) may control for 
the possibility to realise scale economies. One might also expect that a large number of municipalities 
                                                                                                                                                       
administrative definition as well as the variable describing industry structure. The correlation between city and 
urban is 0.57 and the correlation between rural and >75 (more than 75 percent occupied in the agricultural 
sector is 0.14. 
5 At this point in time, the most common municipal unions provided police services, rescue services and 
schooling. 
6 The parish is a local church community. The hundred is an old administrative unit (a part of the county). 
However, there were no formal administrative responsibilities associated with the hundred at the time of the 
reform.  may reduce the probability that municipalities agree on different matters, which can have a negative 
effect on the decision to accept the proposal. The land area of the new municipality (areaj) is expected 
to have a negative effect on the decision to accept the amalgamation proposal.   
 
The following variables are included in D: 
The  share  of  the  population  in  the  new  municipality,  that  is  residing  in  municipality  i  in  1949 
(pop_sharei), is included to control for the relative power of the municipality. A high share is expected 
to have a positive effect on the willingness to amalgamate since it indicates that the municipality will 
have a strong position in the new municipality. A measure of mean income difference (inc_diffi) is 
constructed as the differences between mean income in municipality i, and the mean income of the 
other  municipalities  in  the  new  constellation.  A  representative  individual  may  interpret  income 
differences as an indication of a higher tax burden after an amalgamation. The income difference is 
therefore expected to have a negative effect on the willingness to amalgamate; a wealthy municipality 
is expected to dislike amalgamation with less wealthy municipalities. A variable is also constructed for 
the political composition (same_poli). The variable takes the value one if all municipalities in the new 
formation  had  the  same  political  majority,  zero  otherwise.  Differences  in  industry  structures 
(same_indi) are captured by a dummy variable equal to one if all municipalities had the same industry 
structure,  zero  otherwise.  In  the  same  way,  a  dummy  variable  is  constructed  for  difference  in 
municipal type (city, borough, rural). The variable is equal to one if the municipalities were of equal 
type, zero otherwise (same_typei). The three same variables are included to control for similarities, or 
differences, between municipalities and their impact on the willingness to amalgamate. We have no a 
priori assumption of how these differences affect the municipal decision to accept the amalgamation 
proposal. These variables may capture differences in preferences for local public goods, which in turn 
may  have  a  negative  effect  on  the  probability  of  accepting  the  amalgamation  proposal.  These 
differences may also indicate that municipalities make strategic considerations, e.g. amalgamation of 
two rural municipalities may induce competition as well as increasing the vulnerability to exogenous 
regional shocks. 
 4. Data 
Data has been collected from Statistical yearbooks (Kommunernas finanser and Årsbok för Sveriges 
kommuner)  and  Thunborg  (1950).  Data  concerning  municipal  statements  have  been  collected  at 
archives in the municipalities and county councils. In 1951, the number of municipalities amounted to 
2 498. Out of the 2045 municipalities that were affected by the reform, 53 municipalities have been 
excluded  due  to  missing  data,  which  leaves  us  with  a  total  sample  of  1992  municipalities.  1251 
municipalities accepted the state imposed amalgamation proposal and 795 rejected the proposal; out of 
these  795  municipalities,  553  municipalities  suggested  an  alternative  formation  of  the  new 
municipality.   
Descriptive  statistics  are  presented  in  table  A1  (appendix)  for  two  categories  of 
municipal responses; the first category is municipalities accepting the amalgamation decision and the 
other category are municipalities rejecting the decision. Some patterns can be found in the descriptive 
statistics. Municipalities accepting the proposal were on average smaller with respect to the number of 
inhabitants  that  is  reasonable  since  small  municipalities  were  more  vulnerable  than  larger 
municipalities. The total land area is larger for municipalities that rejected the proposal. Membership 
in a municipal union also seems to matter for the municipal decision; participation in a municipal 
union is on average higher in municipalities accepting the proposal. A striking difference between 
municipalities accepting and rejecting the proposal is the income difference; municipalities rejecting 
the proposal are wealthier than the other municipalities forming the new municipality.  
 
5. Results 
The  amalgamated municipalities  were highly heterogeneous.  A relatively high share of the newly 
formed municipalities consisted of municipalities that were small in size prior to the reform. However, 
large municipalities were also affected by the reform; the largest municipality in the sample had 83 
279  inhabitants  in  1949.  These  large  municipalities  were  generally  amalgamated  with  smaller 
neighbouring municipalities. Thus, the large municipalities were likely to be affected by the reform 
due to their location and not because they had small tax bases. There are good reasons to believe that 
different municipal types experienced the reform in  quite different ways.  Thus, in addition to the estimation result for the complete sample, we also present estimation results for a restricted sample. 
Since the reform mainly aimed at amalgamating municipalities in a way that they should have at least 
2000  inhabitants,  one  interesting  sample  is  municipalities  with  a  population  size  exceeding  2000 
inhabitants in 1949. There was no immediate need for these municipalities to amalgamate and several 
of these municipalities were forced to amalgamate with smaller municipalities. This sample consists of 
231  municipalities.  The  share  of  municipalities  rejecting  the  proposal  was  relatively  large  in  this 
sample, 37.6 per cent resisted the reform, which should be compared to 16.5 per cent among the total 
number of amalgamated municipalities. The estimation results for the logit model are presented in 
table 1.  
Let us start by discussing the estimation results for the full sample. The first variables 
concern  municipal specific characteristics and their impact on the decision to reject or accept the 
amalgamation proposal. The size of the municipality, measured as the number of inhabitants, has a 
negative impact on the probability of accepting the amalgamation proposal. However, the relationship 
is non-linear; the parameter for squared population is positive indicating that larger municipalities are 
more willing to amalgamate. One interpretation of the result is that small municipalities benefit from 
realisation of scale economies; medium sized municipalities on the other hand may have less scale 
economies to exploit and the loss of control may overweigh the benefits. Large municipalities have no, 
or only marginal, scale economies to exploit, but they do not lose control from amalgamation with a 









 Table 1 Logit estimation results, dependent variable is municipal  
acceptance or rejection of amalgamation proposal 
  Full sample  > 2000 inhabitants 
Variable   Estimate  t-value  Estimate  t-value 
Constant  -0.454    -0.331  -8.809  -2.289 
Popi  -0.002  -6.155  -0.4E-03  -1.918    
Pop_sq  0.2E-06  5.112  0.8E-08  0.810    
Inci  0.7E-03  1.691     0.001  1.026 
Areai  -0.1E-04  -1.285  0.2E-04    0.737 
 Consi  -0.639    -2.485    -0.801     -1.434 
Otheri  -0.783    -2.727  -0.896  -1.227    
50-75i  -0.752  -2.983    1.095     1.396 
 <50i  -1.209  -3.387  1.066     1.185   
Urbani  -2.201    -3.803     1.199  0.951 
Unioni  0.688    3.221  0.360  0.740 
Cityi  0.851  0.861  2.623  1.172   
Boroughi  -0.800  -0.900  -2.262     -1.228 
         
Nr municj  0.777  6.640  1.136    3.768 
Areaj  0.1E-03    0.264  -0.001  -0.702   
Unionj  -0.500  -1.623     -0.952  -1.225 
Parishj  0.720  3.181  0.626    1.326 
Hundredj  -0.680  -1.404    0.045  0.040   
         
Pop sharei  4.833  5.044    9.500      3.956   
Inc diffi  -0.4E-03  -1.055  -0.002  -2.026 
Same_poli  0.014  0.070  0.594  1.408 
Same_indi  -0.214  -0.922  0.350  0.652 
Same_typei  -0.920  -1.855     -1.430  -0.995   
         
Pseudo R
2  0.310    0.381   
Nr. obs.  1 415    231   
Note: Dummy variables for counties are not presented  
in the table. Pseudo R
2 is computed as a likelihood ratio 
index. The mean income in the municipality has a positive impact on the municipal decision to accept the 
amalgamation proposal, although the parameter is not significantly determined at the 95 per cent level. 
One explanation may be that municipalities with a low tax base receive high state grants and expects 
to receive high grants if they can remain unaffected by the reform (we do not have data on state grants 
dispensed). Municipalities that did not amalgamate also received very high state grants after the 1952 
reform compared to amalgamated municipalities (see Hanes, 2003). The parameter for land area is 
negative but not significantly determined at the 95 per cent level. Political variables seem to have 
impact on the municipal willingness to amalgamate. Municipalities with a socialist majority in the 
local parliament are more positive to amalgamations than conservative and “other” local governments. 
This result may reflect the fact that the conservative parties to some extent opposed the expansion of 
the local government sector and the 1952 municipal reform.  It is also clear that the industry structure 
is of importance; municipalities with a high share of the population employed in the agriculture sector 
are more likely to accept the amalgamation proposal than those with a lower share. This is likely to 
capture  expectations  of  future  economic  development  in  the  municipality  and  the  need  for 
amalgamations. The negative effect increases when the share of the agriculture sector decreases. If a 
municipality participated in a municipal union, the probability of acceptance is higher. Note that the 
members of the municipal union do not need to coincide with the members of the newly formed 
municipality. Whether the municipality is a city or borough does not have a significant effect on the 
decision to accept the proposal. 
The  next  parameters  in  the  table  are  concerned  with  the  characteristics  of  the  new 
municipality. The number of old municipalities amalgamating into the new unit has a positive and 
strongly  significant  effect  on  the  probability  of  accepting  the  proposal.  One  interpretation  is  that 
amalgamation of many municipalities indicates that the newly formed municipality is able to realise 
scale economies to a larger extent than an amalgamation of few municipalities. The land area of the 
new municipality does not affect the decision to accept or reject the proposal. We have included three 
variables that indicate co-operation or administrative relations prior to the reform. The first variable is 
whether the municipalities have co-operated together in a municipal union prior to the reform. The 
parameter is negative but not significantly determined at the 95 per cent level. At a first glance this results seems to contradict the finding that co-operation in a union, with other members than the 
amalgamating  partners,  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  accepting  the  proposal.  One 
interpretation of the result is that municipalities consider co-operation to be important, however, some 
municipal unions may not have worked well. If the new municipality coincides with the borders of an 
old parish, the probability of acceptance is higher. The parishes are old administrative borders for the 
church  and  may  indicate  that  there  is  some  natural  affinity  between  municipalities.  If  the  new 
municipality  is  an  old  hundred  does  not seem  to  affect  the  decision.  One  explanation  is  that  the 
hundred is a much larger administrative unit compared to the parish. Furthermore, the hundred is an 
administrative unit which is less associated with local traditions and culture compared to the parish. 
The  final parameters concern differences between municipalities. The parameter  for 
population share is positive and significant. Thus, a municipality is more likely to accept a proposal if 
the other municipalities are relatively small. This result indicates that the relative power in the new 
constellation is an important variable; municipalities are willing to amalgamate as long as they do not 
lose  leverage  in  the  new  municipality.  Income  differences,  political  differences  or  differences  in 
industry structure do not seem to affect the decision to accept or reject the proposal. However, if 
municipalities are of the same type (rural, city, borough) this seems to have a negative effect on the 
decision to accept the proposal. 
Let us continue with the results for the restricted sample; i.e. municipalities with more 
than 2000 inhabitants prior to the reform. According to the reform policy, these municipalities were in 
no immediate need of amalgamation; however, they were often forced to amalgamated with smaller 
neighbouring municipalities. Few parameters are significantly determined for this sample compared to 
the full sample; however, the model predicts acceptance better for the restricted sample. The number 
of inhabitants has a negative effect on the municipal decision. However, there is no evidence of a non-
linear effect in population for this sample.  Furthermore, the number of  municipalities in the new 
formation has a positive and significant effect. The effect of relative size of the municipality is still 
positive and significantly determined. Finally, the negative effect of income difference is significantly 
determined  for  the  restricted  sample,  indicating  that  wealthier  municipalities  do  not  want  to 
amalgamate with less wealthy municipalities.  
6. Discussion 
In  this  paper  we  study  municipal  preferences  for  a  state  imposed  local  government  reform.  The 
empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  extensive  1952  municipal  reform  in  Sweden  that  reduced  the 
number of municipalities from 2,498 to 1,037. There was a strong resistance at the local level, as much 
as 66 percent of the newly formed municipalities had at least one municipality that rejected the final 
amalgamation proposal by the county administrations. However, municipalities had no veto power. 
The  results  indicate  that  the  probability  of  accepting  the  amalgamation  proposal 
decreases  with  municipal  size,  i.e.  small  municipalities  are  more  likely  to  accept  the  proposal. 
However, the relationship is non-linear; at a critical size the probability of accepting the proposal 
increases  with municipal size. One explanation is that small municipalities may realise significant 
scale economies through amalgamations. For medium sized municipalities the loss of control in an 
amalgamation may not be outweighed by the positive effect since they are less likely to realise scale 
economies. When a municipality reaches a critical size, it is likely to remain in control over public 
good provision even if they amalgamate and they may still realise some scale economies. These results 
contradicts Brasington (2004), who found that large school districts are willing to consolidate while 
small districts do not want to consolidate with large districts. There may be several explanations to the 
diverse  results.  While  Brasington  (2004)  analysed  consolidation  of  districts  providing  a  specific 
service, the present study concerns a nationwide municipal reform that was implemented in connection 
to an extensive growth of the public sector. As a consequence, several municipalities were far too 
small in order to fulfil the welfare commitments that were determined by the national government. 
Other factors that  might explain preferences of small governments  may be differences in vertical 
integration, e.g. to what extent are local governments granted and do they expect to be granted if they 
remain in autonomy? 
Another robust result is that the relative size of the municipality has a positive effect on 
the  municipal  decision  to  accept  the  proposal.  The  result  indicates  that  it  is  important  for  the 
municipalities to remain leverage in the new municipality, which is consistent with the population 
effect discussed above. We also find that co-operation prior to the reform, but also other common administrative  borders  such  as  parishes,  may  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  decision  to  accept  the 
proposal. Political factors also seemed to affect the municipal opinions. Municipalities with socialist 
majority  were  more  likely  to  accept  the  proposal  compared  to  municipalities  with  conservative 
parliaments.  However,  political  differences  between  municipalities  do  not  seem  to  matter  for  the 
decision to accept the proposal. 
Since the main objective of the reform was that municipalities should have a minimum 
of 2,000 inhabitants, we have also analysed municipal statements for municipalities that were larger 
than the critical size prior to the reform. There was no immediate need for these municipalities to 
amalgamate.  The  municipal  size,  and  relative  municipal  size,  is  still important  for  explaining  the 
municipal statement. Furthermore, the income difference is found to have a negative effect in this 
sample,  meaning  that  wealthier  municipalities  do  not  want  to  amalgamate  with  less  wealthy 
municipalities. 
  Although the empirical analysis is based on a reform that was implemented more than 
50  years  ago,  the  results  may  be  valid  for  the  present  discussion  concerning  the  formation  of 
governments since the processes behind unification  are likely to be similar.  Although the present 
analysis must be seen in the light of the historical context, similar environmental circumstances can be 
identified today; e.g. the depopulation of rural areas that can be seen in several countries combined 
with welfare commitments that to some extent are determined by the national government. A striking 
feature  of  the  results  is  the  relationship  between  size,  and  relative  size,  and  the  willingness  to 
amalgamate.  Amalgamation  processes  are  generally  driven  by  a  desire  to  realise  scale  economies 
which implies that localisation of public services are likely to be a critical issue, e.g. schools, fire 
stations, and libraries. Thus, amalgamations are often associated with a competition of the location of 
public  services.  Since  the  spatial  distribution  of  public  services  may  be  important  for  migration 
decisions as well as for firm locations, the competition concerning public service locations may have a 
strong impact on the willingness to amalgamate. There may be a fear of an unbalanced development 
within the municipality. This problem is evident in sparsely populated areas. The dilemma described 
here is less likely to be a source of conflict when a small municipality amalgamates with a much larger 
municipality. However,  when equally sized municipalities amalgamate, the bargaining of different localities might be a severe obstacle for reaching voluntary agreements. The dilemma for equally sized 
units to reach voluntary agreements may also be seen in the light of the resent contributions within the 
field of new economic geography (see,  e.g.  Krugman, 1998). A general conclusion from the new 
economic geography is that an equilibrium with equally sized regions is unstable; a small change may 
lead to core-periphery pattern with one expanding, wealthy, region and one shrinking region. In the 
context of municipal amalgamations, one might argue that the location of public services can be the 























Table A1: Descriptive statistics for municipalities, accepting / rejecting the amalgamation  
decision in 1951 
Variable   mean  St dev  min  max 
Popi  1237 / 2031  3135 / 1352  69 / 257  83279 / 12505 
Inci  1803 / 1764  378 / 363  914 / 915  4514 / 3027 
Areai  6860 / 15460  13115 / 23756  45 / 138  252060 / 213150 
Soci  0.24 / 0.31  0.43 / 0.46     
 Consi  0.55 / 0.47  0.50 / 0.50     
Otheri  0.21 / 0.22  0.40 / 0.42     
>75 i  0.42 / 0.19  0.49 / 0.39     
50-75i  0.40 / 0.47  0.49 / 0.50     
 <50i  0.13 / 0.24  0.34 / 0.43     
Urbani  0.45 / 0.92  0.21 / 0.29     
Unioni  0.75 / 0.44  0.43 / 0.50     
Cityi  0.018 / 0.012  0.14 / 0.11     
Boroughi  0.007 / 0.04  0.09 / 0.19     
         
Nr municj  4.71 / 2.71  2.87 / 0.98  2 / 2  18 / 7 
Areaj  238 / 361  283 / 422  22 / 34   3084 / 2899 
Unionj  0.12 / 0.11  0.32 / 0.31     
Parishj  0.20 / 0.25  0.40 / 0.43     
Hundredj  0.035 / 0.50  0.18 / 0.22     
         
Pop sharei  0.28 / 0.44  0.22 / 0.20  0.005 / 0.06  0.99 / 0.88 
Inc diffi  -9.58 / 40.1  345 / 387  -1318 / -1169  2998 / 1319 
Same_poli  0.30 / 0.42  0.46 / 0.49     
Same_indi  0.12 / 0.28  0.33 / 0.45     
Same_typei  0.91 / 0.91  0.29 / 0.28     
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